In this paper, we describe the problem of checking the integrity of a hard disk for forensics investigation after the computer of a suspect has been seized. 
Introduction
With the rapid developments of the Internet and electronic commerce [1] , digital forensics has become more and more important in a perpetual race with criminals in the application of digital technologies. Nowadays, it is very common to have evidence existing in digital forms [2, 3] such as a deleted file in a hard disk of a suspect's computer. Due to the nature of digital information which is easy to change, one of the biggest problems is how to effectively maintain and check the integrity [4] of digital evidence. Considering the following problem: given a hard disk seized from a suspect's computer, how to effectively check the integrity of the sectors inside the hard disk to confirm that the content on the hard disk remains the same as before and has not been modified or tampered after the investigation (say a few months later) so that the evidence found inside the hard disk can be accepted by courts. Otherwise, the suspect can easily challenge the validity of the collected evidence.
A simple solution, used in most digital forensics tools (e.g. [5] ), is to calculate one single chained one-way hash value for all sectors in a hard disk and stores it securely for later verification. However, it can only provide a yes-or-no answer about the integrity of the whole hard disk and is not accurate enough for the sectors. For example, some of the sectors may suddenly turn into bad [6] after a long time (say a few months) when investigation is required. In some other cases, the suspect is allowed to modify or even delete some sectors on his own (e.g., files classified as Legal Professional Privilege data [7] ). If this occurs, the new hash value calculated will not equal to the stored one. Therefore, it is desired to design a scheme that can identify which sectors affect the integrity, such that the integrity of the evidence on the hard disk can still be verified if the changed sectors are not related to the evidence.
The other extreme technique is to compute a hash value for each sector, then sign and store all these signed hash values for later comparison. This approach is quite straightforward but it needs to store too
Related work
Recently, Jiang et al. proposed a Cylinder-Head-Sector hashing scheme [8] and an improved kdimension hashing scheme (k-D) [9] to check the integrity of the sectors in a hard disk by computing more than one hash value for each sector so as to increase the chance of it being verified successfully even if there are changed (bad or modified) sectors. However it fails to verify some sectors' integrity with a certain probability, especially when more and more sectors are changed.
There are other approaches proposed by the researchers related to data integrity. Context Triggered Piecewise Hash (CTPH) scheme proposed by Kornblum [10] was designed to identify modified versions of known files (not dedicated for hard disk) even if data have been inserted, modified, or deleted in the new files. Therefore, it requires a long running time of computation when the data size n is huge according to O (n log n).
Goodrich et al. [11] designed a scheme to detect and identify alterations from an original data structure by organizing the indexing structures of several fundamental data structures using combinatorial group testing algorithm. However, their algorithm may produce a wrong matrix (although with low probability). Besides, the computational overhead is high when the maximum number of errors d is large according to the formula 6*(d+1)*(d+2)* ln n , where the semi-bracket denotes the upper integer part and n is the number of total items. So is the storage.
Our results
In this paper, we adapt Combinatorial Group Testing algorithm (CGT) with Shifted Transversal Design construction (STD) [12] for the hard disk integrity problem. In efficiency, the cost of both storage and computation is reasonable. In functionality, the changed sectors can be accurately identified if required. The performance of the proposed hashing scheme is evaluated experimentally and compared with that of the k-D scheme (in our experiments k is chosen as 3). Experimental results show that the proposed scheme can save storage with similar computation. Moreover, a 2-stage computation approach is proposed to further improve the efficiency in computation.
It is necessary to claim that the paper does not focus on developing novel CGT algorithm theoretically, but singling out the most appropriate CGT algorithm and adapting it to in the computer forensics area to help solve the integrity checking problem.
Organization of the paper: in Section 2, we propose our idea of adapting CGT to solve the hard disk integrity problem and utilizing the 2-stage approach to reduce the computational time, followed by the discussion of parameter design of STD construction. Our experimental scheme and results are shown and explained in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Hard disk integrity checking using CGT algorithm

Preliminary of CGT
CGT was first proposed by Dorfman [13] during World War II when blood samples of millions of draftees were subject to identical analyses in order to detect a few thousand cases of syphilis. In the original scheme, tester first chooses some blood samples to form a group, extracts a few drops from each of these chosen samples and mixes the drops together, then tests the mixed sample of the group instead of testing the samples one by one. If the outcome of the test is negative, then all samples in the group are clean (disease-free). Otherwise, it implies that this group contains at least one defective sample. From all the outcomes of remarkably few such group tests, it is possible to infer which of a large set of n samples are clean and which are defective. In such a way, the cost of identifying which of n blood samples are tainted can be significantly decreased by applying tests to judiciously chosen subsets of the samples -given any upper bound on the number of tainted samples, a logarithmic (in n) number of tests suffices.
Adapting CGT to solve the hard disk integrity problem
Since CGT is originated from a very simple requirement of cost saving, it can be applied to situations where it is very expensive to test every single one individually of a large number of items and it is necessary to pinpoint the defective items precisely. When CGT is introduced into our scheme to deal with the hard disk integrity problem, an analogy should be made first. Assume that an unchanged sector in hard disk is a clean item and a changed (modified or corrupted) sector is a defective one. The two steps of combining a subset of n sectors in hard disk into a group to form a chain of sectors and computing a cryptographic hash for this chain can be analogous to the one step of mixing blood drops in a subset of n blood samples. And comparing such a hash value to what it is supposed to be, such as a stored hash value, can be analogous to applying a blood test to the mix of blood drops. A mismatch between the computed hash value and the stored hash value indicates that there is at least one changed sector in the subset for that hash. By interpreting the outcomes of all the comparisons, the decoding algorithm of CGT can precisely tag each sector as unchanged or changed.
A CGT algorithm can be non-adaptive or adaptive [18] . In non-adaptive CGT, all the subsets to be tested must be decided before any subset is tested. In adaptive CGT, by contrast, the next subset to be tested has to be chosen based on the outcomes of the previous tests. Although adaptive design usually requires fewer tests, it cannot be applied in our application because it needs multi rounds of interactive communications between the tester and the items under tests, whereas non-adaptive design allows parallelization and is better suited for our case.
CGT guarantees that the algorithm will be able to correctly identify up to d changed sectors as it uses a combinatorial procedure to ensure that no two sectors are mixed together more than a minimum number of times (here is 1), to prevent ambiguous tags. Also, the number of sectors mixed in each test is roughly the same, ensuring the computation required for each chain is similar. However, it is worthy to remark that if there actually exist d' changed sectors and d'>d, some sectors may not be tagged at all while all the other sectors can still be tagged inerrably by CGT. As the untagged sectors may include both unchanged sectors and changed sectors, once the decoding algorithm of CGT detects such a situation (the existence of d' is discovered by the failure of tagging some sectors), some further operations need to be taken, such as checking whether the sector containing evidence is included in the untagged items or retesting them if completeness is sought. Fortunately, with well-chosen testing groups, the number of untagged sectors should be a small percent of total unless the number of changed sectors is much larger than the expected maximum d. In one word, using CGT, we will not mistake any changed sector as unchanged.
Applying CGT in hard disk integrity problem can have the following advantages. Firstly, since the number of stored hash values equals the number of group tests, the storage required for storing the hash values can be greatly decreased by applying CGT. Secondly, CGT can provide a more accurate indication on which sectors are unchanged while the other approaches may lose the integrity checking evidence of a certain sector. Thirdly, even if the actual number of changed sectors excesses the number guaranteed by the CGT design, our approach can still identify the great majority of normal sectors by the decoding algorithm of CGT. Our experimental results will show this point.
stage approach
When the application of CGT is on the hard disk integrity problem, a special consideration should be taken since the hard disk integrity problem has a different setting: combining sectors into a chain is not exactly the same as mixing blood drops together for a test. In the traditional application of blood testing case, running a test on a group containing one hundred samples has the same cost as running the test on a group containing ten samples. However, in the hash value computation case, the cost of computing a hash value of a chain involving one hundred sectors will be more than that of a chain involving ten sectors. Therefore, we need to consider minimizing the number of hash values as well as minimizing the time of computation, and choose the design parameters of CGT construction (see Section 2.4 for details) carefully for different application scenarios.
For the sake of computation efficiency, we exploit data preprocessing to further reduce the computational time. Our idea is to utilize another attraction of hash function: compact object representation. Since each sector will be involved in more than one group and will be computed several times according to CGT's principle, we can first compute a 128-bit digest (MD5) temporarily for one sector, and then take the digest instead of the sector itself into the multiple computations. Actually, this process can be regarded as extracting drop from blood sample and it will not affect the functionality of identifying unchanged (or changed) sectors since it is enough for every group test in CGT to give a yes-or-no answer. With the 2-stage approach, the computational time can be decreased significantly.
CGT Construction by Shifted Transversal Design (STD)
One of the key issues of CGT algorithm is how to design the testing groups, i.e., how to choose subsets of a set into groups, so as to minimize the total number of tests with guaranteed ability of locating the defective samples. A pattern of testing groups with n items and t groups is usually represented by a t*n binary matrix where each cell (i, j) has a 1-entry if and only if item j is contained in test i. Therefore, designing the pattern of testing groups is transferred to the problem of constructing a testing matrix with minimized t. In our application, Shift Transversal Design (STD) [12] , a novel CGT construction proposed in 2006 is employed to provide higher efficiency than other existing nonadaptive designs [19] [20] [21] .
STD starts with the specification of the number of total items (n) and the maximum number of expected defective items (d). These input parameters (n,d) are used to choose the design parameters of STD, q and k, and then STD will produce a 0-1matrixM = STD(n; q; k) with k layers, each of which contains a q×n matrix. Matrix M contains t(=q×k) rows and n columns, representing that there are n items to be tested and t group tests required. While a detailed description and proof of the construction is available in the original STD paper, we present here how the algorithm maps the experimental parameters n and d to the design parameters q and k, as well as how STD constructs testing matrix with design parameters.
With input parameters (n,d), the design parameters (q,k) can be chosen as follows.
(1) Choose a prime number q, with q<n. Start with the smallest prime, 2.
(2) Find the compression power, Γ(q,n)=min{γ|q γ+1 ≥n}, therefore Γ= log n/log q −1. Set k=dΓ+1. (3) Check if this choice of q and k satisfies the guarantee requirements of identifying d defective elements, using the inequality, k≤q.
(4) If the inequality is satisfied, continue to step (5), else choose the next prime in step (1) and repeat steps (2) and (3).
(5) For each q, find its corresponding compression power Γ that satisfies q≥n 1/ (Γ+1) , and calculate the number of tests (t) needed by each (q,k) pair from t=q×k.
(6) Choose the q and k pair to produce the desirable number of tests. After the design parameters are selected, the matrix M = STD(n; q; k) can be constructed as follows. (5) Note that since each item appears only once in each layer, each column has k 1's in it and each row has usually n/q 1's in it.
As we discussed above, our application is a little bit different with the general testing problem. Therefore, we need to consider different application scenarios to determine the design parameters (i.e. q and k). In Section 3, several sets of design parameters of STD will be demonstrated with experimental results for comparison.
Experiments
A series of experiments have been carried out to test the performance of hard disk integrity verification using the CGT-based scheme in terms of (1) the number of hash values needed for verification, (2) the time required to compute the hash values and (3) the detection capability of the scheme when the actual number of changed sectors over the guaranteed number. We developed two schemes using CGT construction with STD for testing, as well as the 3-D scheme for comparison. The 2-stage approach is also deployed with the CGT-based scheme to increase the computation efficiency in our experiments.
Experimental parameters
Two test hard disks are used including HD #1 with capacity of 250GB (total number of sectors N = 488,392,065) and speed of 5,400 rpm, and HD #2 with capacity of 60GB (total number of sectors N = 117,210,240) and speed of 4,200 rpm. The workstation running experimental tests is configured with an Intel ® Core TM 2 CPU (E6750 at 2.66GHz) and 1.97 GB RAM. Following the procedures described in STD algorithm, we set the parameters n and d as 10 6 and 1 respectively. Using these parameters means that all sectors of a hard disk will be divided into smaller blocks, each of which contains 10 6 sectors, and the number of changed sectors contained in each block is expected at most 1, i.e., the maximum probability for a block which contains changed sector is 10 -6 . Note that this probability is far more overestimated than the common one, 10 -9 , which is in the range used previously in the 3-D scheme [9] . The size of each hash value is 128 bits.
Testing matrices for CGT
As described in Section 2.4, with same experimental parameters input, different sets of design parameters can be chosen for STD to accommodate to various applications. Thus, we choose three sets of STD parameters to construct matrices for comparison. Using the chosen parameters, our software tool can handily construct a CGT matrix with STD. Note that the testing matrix needs to be constructed only once which will be kept unaltered for the further use of distributing sectors into test groups. The selected design parameters and the corresponding testing matrices are:  M a =STD(10 6 ;11;6); q a =11; k a =6; t a =66;  M b =STD(10 6 ;101;3); q b =101; k b =3; t b =303;  M c =STD(10 6 ;1511;2); q c =1511; k c =2; t c =3022. Once the testing matrix of CGT is prepared, it can be applied to each block of hard disk to compute hash values. The cost of storage and computations can also be deduced from the matrix. For a block of hard disk containing n sectors, the number of hash values to be computed and stored will be q*k with matrix M=STD(n;q;k). Each of such hash values is computed from a chain of n/q sectors and all n sectors will be involved into hash computations k times because every sector exists once and only once in each layer. Given the number of total sectors in the hard disk N, the total number of hash values to be stored for the whole hard disk will be q*k* N/n with M=STD(n;q;k). In practice, q and k are relatively small constants. The total number of hash values is reasonable and much smaller than that in [11] when d is large. As a comparison, the total number of hash values will be 3*N 2/3 in the 3-D scheme [9] .
Since the performance of CGT algorithm depends on the matrices, before we present the experimental results, we try to analyze the three different settings and matrices. In the following, we only consider the amount of hash values to be stored and the number of hash computations to be computed per 10 6 sectors. For M a , the constructed matrix has only 66 rows and requires the minimum storage of only 66 hash values for every 10 6 sectors. The shortcoming of M a is that it has 6 layers and needs 6*10 6 hash computations for every 10 6 sectors (each sector needs to be computed 6 times), such that the computational time will increase. So, the setting of M a is suitable for the situations where storage for hash values is the factor we concern the most. On the contrary, M c has the fewest number of layers and requires the minimum computations (each sector needs to be computed only twice) and so as the computational time, while it requires the maximum storage of hash values (3,022 hash values per 10 6 sectors). M c is considered to be applicable in situations where sectors are often changed, such as the sectors will be changed in a daily basis when the scheme is extended to normal users. As a tradeoff of storage versus computation, the requirement for storage and computations of M b is in the middle of that for the other two cases with 303 hash values to be stored and 3*10
6 hash values to be computed per 10 6 sectors.
Results and discussion
Experiment 1: basic performance
The two hard disks are tested with M a , M b and M c separately first. Results include absolute time (T abs ), computational time (T compu ) and actual storage of hash values (S hash ) are shown in Table 1 . Here absolute time refers to the total time for generating integrity information with CGT, including the time for reading all sectors and computing hash values. We also check the reading time for purely reading out all sectors of a hard disk, denoted as T read . Such that we can define the time needed for computations as T compu = (T abs -T read ). By the way, it takes 9,459 and 3,489 seconds for pure reading HD #1 and #2 respectively. Note that the data preprocessing approach is not applied yet in this preliminary experiment on purpose to illuminate the difference of performance between using different matrices. The data in Table 1 are consistent with the principle and analysis in the previous sections. Take the experimental results of HD #1 for discussion. When efficiency of storage is considered, applying CGT with M a can have a significant improvement that the storage needed (0.5MB) is about two orders of magnitude less than that of the 3-D scheme (29.8MB). Even with M b , the number of stored hash values for CGT (2.4MB) is still tenfold less than that of the 3-D scheme, while both schemes' costs of hash calculations are similar (6,768 and 6,786 seconds respectively). When efficiency of time is considered, we found that applying CGT with M c requires the least amount of computation (3,964 seconds).
Experiment 2: improved performance
From experiment 1's preliminary results, the special consideration we mentioned before can be illustrated: when CGT is used for digital objects the computational cost will be quite different with different testing matrices used. Although using M a saves the cost of storage, the computational time is much more than using the other matrices. To reduce the computational cost, we apply the 2-stage approach by preprocessing the data and perform the same experiment on HD #1. As shown in Table 2 computations is only 7.5% of that for pure reading and is about 7% of that in previous experiment, even M a is used). Thus, the CGT scheme with 2-stage approach for checking hard disk integrity can save computational cost as well as storage requirement and make this scheme more efficient and feasible. 
Experiment 3: detection capability
We also perform another experiment to test how many unchanged sectors can be identified correctly with the CGT scheme when the actual number of changed sectors (d') excesses the guaranteed d (here d=1). For example, if there are two sectors are changed, j 1 and j 2 respectively, using M a will leave averagely 28 sectors untagged which include j 1 and j 2 while the other (10 6 -28) unchanged sectors can still be validated. In this experiment, we assume that all the changed sectors are in same block (10 6 sectors), and we purposely modify d' sectors with randomized position as changed sectors. Then we collect the number of untagged sectors indicated by CGT verification. After testing 100 rounds, we get the average numbers of untagged sectors (n untag , varied with d') including all changed sectors.
The average numbers of untagged sectors (n untag ) for M a , M b and M c are plotted as a function of the actual number of changed sectors (d') in Figure 1 and a logarithmic (base 10) scale is used for the yaxis. With d' increasing from 1 to 10, n untag increases from 0 to 52,187 (about 5% of total sectors) with M a , i.e., about 95% sectors can be correctly identified. However, the increment of n untag with M b or M c is much slower than that with M a .
For M b , since it is sparser than M a -each row in M b contains only 9,901 ( 10 6 /101 ) 1-entries while each row in M a contains 90,910 ( 10 6 /11 ), it can enhance the accuracy of identifying the unchanged sectors when the number of changed sectors exceeds the maximum guaranteed number. The advantage of M b is that even d′ is ten times of d, the number of untagged sectors is only 866 (about 99.91% of unchanged sectors can be verified). As M c is the sparest one among these matrices, the increment of n untag with M c is also the minimum. 
